Language as Symbolic ActionI.
Kenneth Burke begins his Language
as Symbolic Action with a
definition:
Man is the symbol making (symbol using/misusing) animal, inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative), separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making, goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order), and rotten with perfection. (211) Several
immediate (continuing) matters of importance arise out of this
definition. First, human beings as makers, know their world
not only in immediate sensations and instinct; they also have
reflective
powers and the ability to imagine the unconditioned
thing-in-itself.
Within this reflective power, humanity is able to embody not only a
thing
as it is but as it is not, its opposite. There are no such negatives in
nature: everything simply is what it is and as it is. As a
person's
life is a realm of action, this ability to embody the negative in
reflection
is soon translated to the hortatory, thou shalt not.
Able to imagine a thing other than as it is and called to be a maker, individuals very quickly separate themselves from a state of nature by modifying personal circumstance. Each successive modification of circumstance presents persons with a new state of things as they are and the possibility of an opposite state, things as they are not. Quite naturally the negative posits its negative and the spirit of orders emerges as an ever-present possibility. Finally, the hortatory negative ensures that human beings can never be happy in the world of circumstance as they find it. The ability to embody the negative and its opposite provides humanity with an active image (mythos) of complete action--perfection, teleology, eschatology --toward which the goad of order drives. Where this gets us is this: those very attributes which distinguish human beings as human beings from the other animals are the attributes which separate human beings from an unreflective state in nature. Furthermore, human beings are able by possession of the nagative to imagine a state prior to separation that unreflective state; we are "rotten", driven, by a sense of pre-separation perfection. When we claimed that myth answers, or attempts to answer the questions of etiology, soteriology, and eschatology, we were describing precisely this: human beings are not happy with their actual state; they are able to imagine another pre-separation: pre-lapsarian state; and they are convinced of their ability to act toward realizing a perfection of this present state based on the embodiment of a real realm beyond the present of actual circumstance. Embodiment of realms of action beyond the actual we will term iconic panoply. Hegel notes, " .
. . man possesses an impulse to assert himself . . .
and man does all this, in order that he may as a free agent divest the
external world of its stubborn alienation from himself . .
."
Everywhere human beings are driven to assert their freedom from the
merely
actual, we may dream, and because we are makers, our dreams may take
"present"
shape--dream into memory: act complete. The stuff of tragedy is
humanity
asserting itself over the actual. The stuff of tragedy is the
failure
of a dream. A look at the enveloping action of several tragedies
demonstrates just this, the ever-present human inability to distinguish
an action from its thought. Why "rotten with perfection?":
precisely because humanity is quite capable of bringing dream into
memory
as already present perfected actions. Individuals may 'scene'
themselves
in symbolic confusion, convinced that the dream of an action is already
its immediate present.
II.
Post-of-Observation Focus Setting Imagery Theme Meaning Plot Character (s) Significance
Other possible
paradigms:
Action Actor(s)
. . .
Speaker Context
elements together
Closure
POINTS of
exegetical analysis:
Analogy/Comparison/Simile/Affirmation Writers have
availed themselves of the same language as a means of delivering
different ideas.
J.S. Mill, Logic, l843 It was myn
entente / To forthere trouthe . . . / And to be war
from falseness . . . this was myn menynge . . .
[W.Ger.:
O.E. maenan=OFris. mena to signify, make known (OHG meinen
to have in mind hence also to love), to intend, signify, make known,
mention.
OHG. gemeinan to proclaim, show forth]
A less analytical age could claim the goal of writing was the articulation of meaning. Meaning’s meaning is much debated, and the nature of signification is questioned by literary theoretician and philosopher alike in these last years of the twentieth century. No one would claim, however, that the best writers work from a vacuum. Successful writers work from intentions toward goals. No writer meets those goals precisely, but tracing unmet goals is one important interpretive task. Building a
community of interpretation is a goal of articulation.
At least as early as the pre-Socratic Heraclitus (5-6th cent B.C.),
thinkers
have puzzled over the human tendency toward private --gnostic--
understanding.
It may be our doom to fail in building a community of interpretation,
yet
that has been the ages-old goal of rhetoric and it is not insignificant
that meaning’s etymology contains both proclamation and love.
Meaning—intention : go to the OED for a thorough discussion of meaning and intention; note the relationship between the noun means and the instrumentality of meaning. MEAN --verb-- to
have in mind with purpose, intention, or aim.
The state of sign / signifier / signified / significance in our age is much debated. Using traffic signals as example, it is possible to describe “red” as the signifier and “stop” as the signified. III Kenneth Burke again
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